If India can combine its demand and talent with China’s depth in industrial process and supply chains, the outcome is more than bilateral gain—it is a global stabiliser.

By Ravishankar Kalyanasundaram

India’s relationship with China has always been a paradox—marked by friction at the borders but knitted tightly in the marketplace. For years, our instinct was to raise tariffs and chant self-reliance. Yet the reality is more stubborn: our trade deficit with China threatens the $100‑billion mark, and it is not closing through rhetoric. At the same time, the technologies that will shape the next generation—batteries, solar wafers, machine‑tool controllers—are being perfected at scale in China. The real question is not whether to engage, but how.

The answer lies in collaboration, but firmly on our terms. Collaborate for speed, localise for resilience, and innovate for freedom.

Oh no, we can do it Ourselves?

We often hear that India will soon rival China in lithium batteries. The claim carries more bravado than balance. Saying we can do it ourselves is easy; actually matching Chinese costs and chemistry is another matter. China today controls three‑fourths of global cell output, dominates upstream cathode–anode processing, and has secured raw material supply at the source. India, by contrast, still imports nearly USD 3 billion worth of cells and packs each year. Unless our gigafactories come with embedded know‑how, raw material tie‑ups, and credible localisation clocks, we risk building monuments to self‑reliance that are ironically powered by imported Chinese cells. Indianness must remain our aspiration, but it should be tested unsympathetically, not declared prematurely.

The thaw and the opportunity

Delhi and Beijing are edging back toward a working relationship. Channels are reopening—restored flights, eased visas, talk of resumed border trade. This is not affection, but pragmatism shaped by shifting global winds. Some would say it took a Trump Tariff to remind both sides that there are worse things than dealing with each other. The thaw is useful only if we use it to accelerate our own capabilities, not to deepen dependency. The destination must be clear: learn fast, localise faster, lead soonest.

The timing is no accident. The global economy is at a crossroads: globalisation is fragmenting, supply chains are being redrawn, and a single tariff tweet can rattle markets. Here, India and China together matter not just to each other but to the wider world. What makes the difference now are the hard drivers—technology, cost, scale, and speed. These determine prices, competitiveness, and ultimately, who shapes tomorrow’s markets. If India can combine its demand and talent with China’s depth in industrial process and supply chains, the outcome is more than bilateral gain—it is a global stabiliser.

Seen in this light, India–China collaboration is not about dependency but about delivering at scale to a restless world. Batteries, solar wafers, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals—the global South craves affordable technology, and the West is wary of over‑reliance on any single supplier. A disciplined partnership could deliver cost‑competitive products to Africa, ASEAN, and Latin America while anchoring new capacities inside India. In a Trump‑infested world, where tariffs and sanctions are wielded as blunt weapons, Asia’s two giants have the chance to prove that cooperation can drive down costs, shorten product cycles, and expand choice. Done right, it points to prosperity; done wrong, it leads back to narrow confinement.

Where collaboration can compress time‑to‑market

Take batteries and EVs. India still relies heavily on Chinese lithium‑ion cells and components—imports in 2023 alone touched USD 2.8 billion. A smarter course is joint ventures that build cell plants and cathode–anode supply here, under strict localisation clocks, with Indian custody of data and IP. The BYD–Olectra partnership in e‑buses is early proof: Chinese platforms coupled with Indian assembly and service scaling quickly while domestic capacity learns to stand.

The auto sector offers another example. The SAIC–JSW partnership around MG Motor shows how Chinese product pipelines can be paired with Indian governance. Factories, vendor development, and compliance remain with the Indian partner; advanced EV and connected‑car technologies flow from the Chinese side. The result: time shrinks from concept to showroom, and learning moves from assembly to design.

In pharmaceuticals, India’s formulations are world‑class, but dependence on Chinese APIs and KSMs remains uncomfortably deep. The solution is not to slam the door but to absorb capability: process‑engineering units in Indian pharma parks, retrofitted for green chemistry, with time‑bound transfer agreements that reward faster indigenisation.

Solar is no different. Imports of Chinese PV cells surge even as we build upstream manufacturing. The realistic path is co‑invested cell and wafer lines in India with reciprocal access to process know‑how, Indian board control, and procurement slots for domestic modules. That way we stop reinventing the wheel while beginning to forge our own axle.

And in electronics and industrial kit, China’s dominance in components, machine tools, and opto‑electronics complements India’s strength in assembly and design services. Joint clusters can anchor PCBAs, displays, and precision tooling inside India. Crucially, agreements must mandate teach‑and‑transfer periods, with Chinese master technicians on site only long enough to seed Indian trainers who carry the baton forward.

Caution without paranoia

The line between opportunity and entrapment is thin. Open the doors without discipline and we risk confinement; close them entirely and we risk irrelevance. The discipline lies in guardrails: Indian majority ownership in sensitive sectors, localisation targets audited year by year, IP domiciled here, and mandates for R&D labs on Indian soil.

Even on the most sensitive inputs, the choice is stark: learn quickly with guardrails or learn slowly alone while still importing anyway. The former builds muscle; the latter builds dependency with delay. And the world will not wait. Battery materials, solar wafers, machine tools—these sit today in Chinese scale and supply. The solar and battery chains will not pause for India to perfect its theory. The deficit will not close by slogans, and competitiveness will not arrive by decree.

The bottom line: Travel with China, eyes open and pen sharpened. Collaborate for speed, localise for resilience, and innovate for freedom. Follow the route to prosperity—not to confinement.